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Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency
Fabian Dorsch
1. SOME DIVISIONS IN THE MIND
Try to conjure up a visual image of a sunny forest, or to suppose that Goethe
once visited Stoos in the centre of Switzerland. Presumably, you will be able
to comply immediately and easily, without having to do something else first,
and without having to invest too much effort. But then, try to conjure up a
visual perception of a sunny forest, or to form the judgement that Goethe once
visited Stoos, just like that—that is, without resorting to additional actions, such
as travelling outside of the city, consulting a biography of Goethe, or taking a
perception- or judgement-inducing drug. Presumably, you will fail.
What these examples suggest is that there is a fundamental—though perhaps
not necessarily strict—divide among the phenomena making up our mental
lives. On the one side, there are our deliberate and straightforward mental
actions and the mental episodes which they produce (and sustain). Conjuring
up an image or supposing that something is the case should count—if anything
should—as paradigm instances of deliberate mental agency, namely as instances
of the activity of imagining something.¹ Very roughly, they are examples of
agency because they rationally respond to and are guided and possibly justified
by certain practical reasons (i.e. those provided to us by our desires or intentions
to picture or suppose something); they constitute mental actions because they
are aimed at the production of some mental phenomena (i.e. an image or a
supposition), and because their performance does not involve bodily movements,
but occurs exclusively within the mind; they are deliberate because they are
done in full, attentive consciousness of the means, ends, and intended results
involved; and they are straightforward—or ‘light-fingered’ (O’Shaughnessy
1980: 21–2)—in that they are not done by performing another action which
deliberately exploits certain passive effects (such as those of emotional dispositions,
¹ I defend the view that imagining is indeed a special form of deliberate and straightforward
mental agency in Dorsch (2009).
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hypnosis, or judgement-inducing drugs). Indeed, our ability to imagine seems
to reveal the extreme freedom which we may enjoy in our conscious mental
lives. It is difficult to think of a domain of our agency with fewer restrictions or
obstacles.
On the other side of the divide, there are the more passive mental phenomena,
notably those of our mental episodes, the formation (and sustainment) of which is
either not at all influenced by our mental agency, or only in a mediated—though
usually still deliberate—way. Many episodes occur and disappear without any
active involvement on our behalf.We are often overcome by feelings or sensations,
surprised or annoyed by perceived smells or sounds, or find ourselves suddenly
confrontedwith images, memories, or thoughts. Othermental episodes, however,
are located in between deliberately formed images or suppositions and passively
occurring feelings or perceptions, in that their occurrence or nature is somehow
influenced by deliberate activity, but in a less straightforward or encompassing
way than in the typical case of imagining. You may intentionally calm down
yourself or improve your mood by actively imagining something relaxing or
cheerful, such as walking through a quiet and sunny forest and attending to
the pleasant and soothing sounds and smells of the environment. Or you may
be able to decide when to judge an issue or to remember an appearance, and
which issue to judge or whose appearance to remember. But despite the intended
impact of mental or bodily agency on such episodes, they do not seem to allow
for the straightforward control that we often, if not always, enjoy over what
we imagine. In this respect, they are closer to episodes which occur completely
passively.
My primary interest in this chapter is to get clearer about how, and where,
best to draw the line between the straightforwardly active and the more passive
aspects of our conscious minds. My main focus will thereby be on the question
of whether judging can be as active as imagining: that is, whether we can
form judgements in a deliberate and straightforward manner, or (as I will also
say) voluntarily, or at will. The example above suggests that the answer should
be negative, and that we cannot freely decide which particular proposition to
endorse in a judgement concerning a certain issue.
Indeed, this opinion has been widely endorsed.² But it has not often been
explicitly argued for. And if it has, the arguments have typically made use of the
controversial idea that judgements (or beliefs) are intrinsically and normatively
linked to truth. I am sympathetic to the view that there is no real need to
take up, but good reason to try to avoid, any commitment to such a norm for
² See e.g. Williams (1973), Winters (1979), O’Shaughnessy (1980), Bennett (1990), Noordhof
(2001), Engel (2002), Owens (2003), and Shah and Velleman (2005). Even thinkers, who are more
sympathetic to the idea of voluntary formations of judgements or belief, often defend this possibility
without accepting (or at least arguing for) the possibility of judgements or beliefs formed directly in
response to the intention to do so (cf. Weatherson’s (2007) discussion, and especially his contrast
between voluntary and volitional agency).
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judgements (cf. Papineau 1999; Dretske 2000). And I will in addition illustrate,
though only briefly, that the normative approach to the involuntariness of
judgements faces a serious and not always noted problem.
As an alternative, I will present an argument which refers to the ways in
which we consciously experience judgements and instances of deliberate mental
agency. What is important about this argument for the involuntariness of
judgements is not so much its perhaps uncontroversial conclusion, but rather the
particular way in which it tries to support it. For it highlights the impact which
conscious experience has on—as well as what this form of awareness can tell us
about—the formation of judgements and the scope of deliberate mental agency.
The resulting account is thus meant to be a promising competitor for theories
which account for judgements and mental agency primarily in normative or
functionalist terms.
The issue of whether we can form judgements at will can, as already suggested,
be framed in terms of the question of whether the deliberate formation of a
judgement can sometimes be as active as the conjuring up of an image or the
making of a supposition, or whether instead it belongs always to the group
of less active mental phenomena, which includes not only the passive cases of
perceiving, sensing, or feeling something, but also the somewhat active cases of
changing one’s mood or bringing about the occurrence of an episodic memory.
What distinguishes in particular the two ways in which we can deliberately
influence the occurrence or nature of some of our mental episodes is that one is
(as I have called it) more straightforward, or less mediated, than the other. Before
I discuss both the normative and the experiential approach to the involuntariness
of our judgements, it is perhaps helpful to say a bit more about what judgements
are, and what characterizes straightforward deliberate agency.
Judgements—including occurrent beliefs—are mental episodes. As such, they
are part of the stream of consciousness and of the same general kind of mental
state as feelings, thoughts, sensations, perceptions, and so on.³ More specifically,
judgements consist in the conscious taking of a propositional and conceptual
content to be true, which means that they do not—like suppositions—merely
represent things as being a certain way, but also make the claim that this is how
things are.⁴ This is one important respect in which judgements differ from the
events which constitute their formation (e.g. acts of judging): only the former,
³ What I label ‘mental episodes’, Wollheim calls ‘mental states’ (1984: 33–4). And I will use
the latter expression to cover not only mental episodes or events, but also dispositional or standing
states, such as beliefs, desires, and so on. Accordingly, my talk of ‘states’ is not intended here as
involving any commitment to a certain ontological category—such as to their being states of affairs,
rather than events, activities, or processes.
⁴ This does not suffice to distinguish judgements from guesses. What is needed in addition is that
it is constitutive of a guess, but not of a judgement, that it originates in the conscious practical or
arbitrary choice of one or another from a certain range of propositions, none of which are sufficiently
supported or forced upon us by the evidence available to us, but which may none the less be among
the acceptable options of choice only because they all enjoy at least some evidential backing.
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but not the latter, are instances of episodic and committal thought. Another is
that, while events of forming a judgement are often, or perhaps even always,
instantaneous, the formed judgements may remain in continuous existence for
a considerable amount of time. Our judgement that the person opposite us is
very attractive, for example, may stay in the background of our conscious mind
during our evening-long conversation and constantly influence what we say to,
and how we treat, her or him.⁵ And the same is true of many of our judgemental
endorsements of the propositions which we use as premisses in more complex
instances of reasoning.
The contrast between straightforward and mediated deliberate agency, on
the other hand, is best drawn—at least for the current purposes—in terms
of the fact that, while the latter involves the instrumental reliance on certain
epistemic or merely causal processes and their passive effects, the former does
not. The relevant processes are thereby characterized by the fact that, once
they are triggered by us and progress normally, they lead by themselves—that
is, without further help or involvement of agency or other factors external to
them—to the desired or intended outcome. And to instrumentally rely on such
processes means here to employ them as means in relation to their sufficiency,
once triggered and progressing normally, to bring about the desired or intended
outcome. What this involves, more specifically, is that we take the respective
processes to be instrumental in achieving our goal; that we take them to be
so partly by recognizing their capacity to lead by themselves to the desired
outcome; and that we try to act on our relevant desires or intentions by means of
trying to trigger the processes in question. Accordingly, an instance of deliberate
agency aiming at the production of a mental phenomenon is mediated—and
not straightforward—just in case the agent attempts to achieve this aim by
trying to employ an epistemic or merely causal process as a sufficient means
for bringing about the desired mental phenomenon. Any other involvement of
epistemic or merely causal factors is compatible with both kinds of deliberate
mental agency.
Consequently, we may still rationally endorse a proposition in a guess—but presumably not in a
judgement—even when the proposition lacks sufficient epistemic support (cf. Owens 2003).
The offered characterization of judgements is also meant to focus the current discussion
exclusively on kinds of judgement which are truth-apt and to be formed and assessed in relation
to epistemic reasons. Whether this includes normative judgements (e.g. about what one ought to
do, how things ought to be, or what is good) or judgements linked to or identified with intentions
(e.g. about what one will do) depends on whether the correct account of these judgements will
understand them as truth-apt and epistemic, or rather as expressive or as practical. However, my
hope is that our experience of them as being formed in response to reasons—whether these are
epistemic or practical—is also incompatible with any experience of them as being formed in a
straightforward manner; and that this provides us again with an argument for their involuntariness.
See Pink (1996) for an excellent discussion of, as well as a slightly different argument for, the
involuntariness of decisions, desires, and normative judgements which are formed—or at least
meant to be formed—in response to practical reasons.
⁵ Thanks to Kevin Mulligan for suggesting this example.
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For example, when we deliberately attempt to recall the appearance of a certain
person, we thereby set in motion certain epistemic mechanisms because we expect
them to force a specific image onto us that is likely to be accurate. If we lacked
this expectation, we would probably often not bother engaging our memory, but
instead opt for our ability to imagine appearances. And something very similar
happens when we decide to judge an issue on the basis of the evidence available
to us: we thereby assume that the proposition, which the evidence will compel us
to endorse due to some underlying epistemic processes, will probably be true.⁶
Similarly, we can reasonably decide and try to cause a change in our mood by
imagining a certain scenario only if we believe that performing the latter action is
likely to be instrumental in bringing about the desired alteration of how we feel.
Otherwise, there would be no reason for us to engage in the imaginative activity
in response to our wish to alter our mood. And when we deliberately take a drug
in order to cause in us certain hallucinations, we do this precisely because of our
reasonable expectation that the respective causal mechanisms, thereby triggered
by us, are very likely to lead to the occurrence of such hallucinations. In the
absence of this expectation, we normally would not take the drug, or at least not
with the aim of hallucinating.
Imagining something, in contrast, does not involve similar instrumental beliefs
about and exploitations of epistemic or merely causal mechanisms. Although
straightforward agency may allow for the influence of, or even conscious reliance
on, epistemic factors, this kind of influence appears never to be mediated by
an epistemic process which is—or, at least, which we instrumentally believe
to be—sufficient on its own to lead to the occurrence of whichever mental
phenomenon has been wished for. Our successful attempt at visualizing a sunny
forest, say, may very well be informed by our knowledge of how sunny forests
look like, or of what it would be like to see a sunny forest. But the influence
of this kind of knowledge on the resulting visual image is not mediated by (an
instrumental belief about) a rational process pertaining to epistemic rationality
which, once actively triggered, is alone responsible for the occurrence of the
image. In particular, we do not form the visual image in response to our
⁶ What happens in these cases is perhaps that our sole reason to rely on epistemic processes
is that we are interested in producing true representations, and that we take epistemic processes
(and nothing else) to be truth-conducive. But instead, it might also be a fact that basic cases
of reliance on epistemic mechanisms within mediated mental agency do not actually involve the
instrumental understanding and employment of the respective epistemic mechanisms. When we,
say, begin to act on our decision to recall the appearance of a friend, we perhaps might not have
to possess or use the instrumental belief that a good way of achieving this goal is to actively
trigger the respective underlying mnemonic mechanisms. If this should turn out to be true, the
characterization of the difference between straightforward and mediated agency would have to be
refined accordingly—for instance, by weakening the respective condition to the effect that only
the possibility, but not the actuality, of instrumental employment of the processes is to be taken
into account; or by supplementing it with the condition that, if epistemic factors are concerned, it
is alone decisive whether these are in fact triggered by our active engagement and furthermore by
themselves sufficient to bring about the desired outcome, once started and progressing normally.
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current recognition of some epistemic reasons (as in the case of the formation
of judgements on perceptual or inferential grounds). And the occurrence of
the visual image is not the direct result of a mechanism meant to preserve a
rational link to epistemic reasons recognized in the past (as in the case of episodic
memories based on past perceptions).
Similarly, it may be true that, when we successfully visualize a sunny forest,
our employment of our capacity to visualize sunny forests is causally responsible
for the occurrence of the respective visual image. And this again may involve, or
be grounded in, more fundamental causal chains. But in order to successfully act
on our intention to visualize a sunny forest, we need not, and do not, conceive of
the causal processes concerned as sufficient means. We may take the employment
of our capacity to visualize sunny forests to be a necessary part of visualizing a
sunny forest, and we may even understand what we are then doing as the action
of visualizing a sunny forest by means of actively making use of the respective
capacity. But we do not thereby think of the link between our employment of
this capacity (or similar capacities, such as the capacity to visualize trees) and the
occurrence of the visual image in both causal and instrumental terms (if we think
of the link or its potential causal nature at all). In particular, we do not form
the intention to use our capacity to visualize sunny forests in rational response to
our intention to visualize a sunny forest and an instrumental belief that making
active use of this capacity is likely to cause the occurrence of the desired visual
image. In fact, we would not know what it would mean to act on the intention
to use our capacity to visualize sunny forests, if not to act on the intention to
visualize one or more sunny forests.⁷
2. THE NORMATIVE APPROACH
In the light of the preceding considerations, themain task in the formulation of an
argument for the claim that judgements can be formed at will is the identification
of a constraint on all possible judgements, which puts them beyond our deliberate
and straightforward control: that is, which prevents them from being consciously
formed by us in direct response to our desire or intention to form them, without
any instrumental exploitation of passive processes. If the constraint would not
apply to all possible judgements, it could not completely account for the fact
(assuming that it is one) that none of them can be formed by us at will, including
the unconstrained ones. Furthermore, the constraint has to concern the ways in
⁷ Note also that the case of visualizing someone by means of visualizing a portrait of this person
still counts as an instance of straightforward agency, given that visualizing the portrait is neither
epistemic, nor merely causal in nature, but instead itself a straightforward action. As a result, not all
instances of straightforward agency need to be basic in the sense of not being performed by doing
something else.
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which judgements can be actively formed: it has to limit these ways in such a
manner as to rule out the possibility of a deliberate and straightforward formation
of judgements.
The most prominent strategy has been to derive such a constraint from the
assumed fact that judgements are normatively linked to, or aim at, truth in such
a way that they are subject to the following truth norm:⁸
(TN) Judgements ought always to be true, and to be formed only if they are
true.
This truth norm is usually introduced for very different purposes, such as
to capture the essence of judgements (or beliefs), or to account for their
representationality and their link to truth (cf. Papineau (1999) and Dretske
(2000) for a detailed discussion). That it may also figure in an account of the
involuntariness of judgements is often only noted as an aside—if it is noted at
all. But the truth norm is none the less predestined for playing this particular role
because, when formulated in terms of (TN), it purports to achieve two things:
to govern all possible judgements; and to put a restriction on the ways in which
we can deliberately form them.
But not just any understanding of the truth norm and its impact on judgements
can help in explaining the involuntariness of judgements. In particular, it does not
suffice to identify the constraint on judgements and their deliberate formation,
as it arises out of their assumed subjection to (TN), with the demand that, when
deliberately forming a judgement (in contrast to another kind of mental episode),
we should act on the aim to form the respective mental episode only if it is true.
According to this demand, it is better or more appropriate to pursue truth as
one’s goal when deliberately forming a judgement. But it is not necessary, given
that the possibility of violating the demand is not ruled out. Although one would
be somehow at fault or irrational when ignoring or not following the demand,
whether one satisfies it has no influence on whether one counts as deliberately
forming a judgement. As a consequence, the demand does not really limit the
ways in which judgements may be deliberately formed, it puts a restriction solely
on when such an intentional formation may count as proper. It is, accordingly,
not strong enough to prevent the occurrence of judgements which are formed
entirely at will.
Therefore, the constraint on judgements derived from (TN) has to be
understood in stronger terms. The most natural way of strengthening the
condition on how we can deliberately form judgements seems to be to modify it
⁸ See, for instance, Williams (1973) and Shah and Velleman (2005) for defences of this strategy
and the kind of normativity involved, and Winters (1979), Bennett (1990) and Engel (2002) for
critical discussions. See also Burge’s writings, Peacocke (1998), Wedgwood (2002) and Shah (2003)
for endorsements or explications of the idea that beliefs are subject to a truth norm, and that
conformity to this norm requires us to believe something only if it is true. It is not unlikely that
they will be sympathetic with the normative approach to the involuntariness of judgements.
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in such a way that its satisfaction becomes constitutive of the deliberate formation
of a judgement, instead of merely rendering examples of it appropriate.⁹ The
result will be something like the following requirement:
(C) Deliberately forming a judgement requires acting on the aim to form it only
if it is true.
Thus, if we do not have this goal in mind and do not actively and consciously
try to achieve it, then we are not engaged in the deliberate formation of a
judgement—although we still might be engaged in the intentional or active
formation of a mental episode of another kind (e.g. a supposition), or experience
the passive occurrence of a judgement.
Understanding the constraint in this way does indeed promise to establish its
incompatibility with any potential straightforward voluntariness of judgements.
It seems plausible to say that deliberately acting on the aim to form a mental
episode only if it is true requires making use of truth-conducive means. And, it
may be further argued, reliance on truth-conducive means renders the respective
mental agency mediated in the sense specified above. The idea is that only the
reliance on epistemic reasons is likely to result in the formation of a true mental
state. For, the assumption goes, there do not appear to be truth-conducive means
other than epistemic considerations. Hence, the requirement (C) comes down to
the demand that the deliberate formation of judgements has to happen by means
of passive—namely epistemic—processes: judgements have to be deliberately
formed on the basis of epistemic reasons (if they are to be deliberately formed
at all). It follows from this that we cannot deliberately form judgements in a
straightforward manner.¹⁰
But the constraint (C) does not apply to all possible or even all actual
judgements. Paradigm examples of judgements, which are successfully formed
in deliberate response to the desire or intention to form them, but without the
aim in mind to form them only if they are true, are manipulative or induced
judgements. Manipulated judgements are based on evidence, the collection of
which involves ignoring evidence of a certain kind, or unproportionally or
exclusively seeking evidence of another kind. Here are some good examples:¹¹
Consider people who aim deliberatively to mislead themselves. Suppose an elderly man
realises that he is likely to be upset if he learns about the real probability of his developing
⁹ Williams (1973) can plausibly be read as adopting this strategy (cf. also Winters 1979).
¹⁰ This argument is very similar to one of the arguments for the same conclusion in Williams
(1973), only transposed from the conceptual level to the level of constitution (cf. my discussion
in the last section). Proust (Ch. 13 below) presents a slightly different argument, the central idea
of which seems to be that the aim of truth does not allow for the freedom of choice essential to
deliberate agency.
¹¹ See O’Shaughnessy (1980), Owens (2000), Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005)
for further examples of manipulated judgements, or ‘wishful thinking’. Wedgwood (2002) also
mentions the possibility of acting on one’s intention to cease or avoid having a certain belief.
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cancer, and so arranges to avoid any evidence that might undermine his sanguine belief
that this probability is low. Or suppose an adolescent youth learns that people with
an inflated view of their own worth are generally happier and more successful, and
so deliberately seeks out evidence which will make him think overly well of himself.
Of course, there are familiar psychological difficulties about deliberately arranging to
have false beliefs, but examples like this suggest they are not insuperable. (Papineau
1999: 24)
There are probably many other, and possibly more radical, ways in which
we can manipulate our evidence, other than by being unduly selective. For
instance, we may ignore the lack of quality of some pieces of evidence (e.g. by
relying on untrustworthy sources), ormay invent ormisread some of them (e.g. by
misinterpreting emotional feelings as evidence). By contrast, induced judgements
are formed in much simpler ways: they are not evidentially based, but instead
occur as the product of some causal process which is intentionally triggered by
some action of the subject in question. Examples of induced judgements would
be those which would occur as the effect of the intake of a suitable drug, or of
the visit to a hypnotist. They have in common with manipulated judgements
that, often, they are deliberately formed without the aim of truth in mind. And
although they may, as a consequence, end up being epistemically inappropriate,
this does not undermine their possibility.
One might wish to insist that cases of manipulated or induced judgements
do not really constitute counter-examples to (C), either because the mental
episodes involved are not really judgements, or because they are not really
actively or deliberately formed, so that their formation does not have to meet
the necessary condition on the deliberate formation of judgements established
by the constraint.¹² But it seems entirely ad hoc to claim that the examples
do not concern judgements, given that the mental episodes in question endorse
a proposition as true and are phenomenologically indistinguishable from more
typically formed judgements (cf. Winters 1979 and Engel 2002). And the
view that manipulated or induced judgements are not formed in an active and
deliberate manner appears equally implausible. It is true that the agency involved
leads to the occurrence of the judgement only in a mediated way. But something
very similar is true of many other cases which we are normally happy to classify
as deliberate actions. If bringing about the occurrence of a specific judgement by
intentionally taking a drug in the full knowledge and reasonable expectation that
this intake is likely to lead to the desired occurrence of the judgement is indeed
As O’Shaughnessy and Papineau observe, the intentional manipulation of one’s judgements may
require a certain amount of self-deception.
¹² In personal conversation, Shah mentioned that he is inclined to the view that the formation of
manipulated or induced judgement should not count as an instance of (deliberate) agency. Indeed,
he and Velleman seem to have to adopt this line of response, since they acknowledge the possibility
of these types of judgements, but also believe that judgements cannot be formed at will because of
their special normative nature described by (TN) (cf. Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005).
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not taken to constitute an action, then bringing about the death of a person by
pulling a trigger or bringing about the arrival of a letter by posting it should not
count as deliberate actions either.
Of course, the occurrence of the judgement is itself not an action. But neither
is the occurrence of the death of the person, nor the arrival of the letter (at least
not regarding the person who has sent it). Instead, what is actively done by the
subject in question is the intended and expected bringing about of the occurrence
of these passive events. And the subject performs this complex action—which
may reasonably be described as the forming of a judgement, the killing of a
person, or the sending of a letter—by performing a much simpler action, namely
the taking of the drug, the pulling of the trigger, or the posting of the letter.
It might still be attempted to maintain that, in general, there are no complex,
but only simple actions; and that the latter do not allow for individuation and
description in terms of their intended and expected causal consequences. But
then, the formation of the judgement, the killing of the person, and the sending
of the letter would still be on a par, since they all would equally not count as
actions. And this result would fatally clash with our ordinary treatment of events
of shooting someone or sending a letter—and not only of events of pulling a
trigger or posting a letter—as instances of agency.¹³
The only significant difference between the two kinds of cases is that the
occurrence of the judgement, but presumably not the occurrence of the death
or the arrival of the letter, presents itself phenomenally to the agent as passive.¹⁴
However, this is not the result of the judgement perhaps being brought about
non-intentionally, or less actively than the two external events, but instead due
to the fact that the judgement is part of the conscious mind of the subject and
thus accessible to him in a different way than the external events. If he were
able to become aware of the latter in the same way, he probably would experience
them as passive as well. Moreover, the fact that the judgement is part of the
subject’s own mind, and not of another’s, seems irrelevant for whether knowingly
and expectantly bringing about of a judgement by, say, the administering of a
drug should count as an action. None the less, this difference in how we are
¹³ Even proponents of the view that only tryings are actions often enough permit that action
descriptions can apply to complex events consisting in tryings and their causal results, as long as
there is a suitable or non-deviant causal link between the two (cf. Hornsby 1980: 122–3; also
O’Shaughnessy 1980).
¹⁴ Another difference—though probably cutting across the cases—is that we do not always have
established action terms available to directly pick out the more complex actions. We call the action
of deliberately bringing about the death of a person by doing something simply a ‘killing’. But
there is no such action term for the action of deliberately bringing about the sleep of a person (e.g.
oneself ) by administering a drug to her. And the expression ‘forming a judgement’, as used for the
action of deliberately bringing about the occurrence of a judgement by taking a respective drug, is
probably not commonly understood as an action term. Note, however, that the last term, as well
as the related expression ‘the formation of the judgement’, is meant here to pick out the event of
doing something in order to cause the occurrence of a certain judgement, and not merely the event
of this judgement occurring.
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aware of judgements and external events may still ultimately explain why we
may have the intuition that murdering a person or sending a letter have more
right to count as actions than forming a judgement in one of the mediated ways
mentioned.
It is conceivable that the truth-related normativity of judgements may give
rise to requirements other than (C). But it is doubtful that any of them can be
both weak enough to apply to all possible judgements, and strong enough to be
incompatible with the deliberate and straightforward formation of judgements.
In addition, the strategy of taking some constraint like (C) to be responsible for
the involuntariness of judgements faces other difficulties, some of which I want
to briefly mention.
A first challenge is to provide independent support for the claim that judge-
ments are normative in the sense described. Critics of this idea have pointed
out that it suffices for a satisfactory account of judgements (or beliefs)—which
can explain, for instance, what differentiates judgements from other mental
episodes, or how they represent the world—to assume that they have certain
(evolutionary evolved) functions, notably the function to be true. This picture
treats truth as a value for judgements, but as a value among many, which may
be outweighed or undermined by the other values and thus need not always
bind judges. That is, the latter need not always, when deliberately forming a
judgement, be under the obligation to form it only if it is true. Accordingly, if
the formation of a judgement is subject to such a truth-related obligation, this
cannot be due to the general, intrinsic nature of judgements, but has to derive
from something else, such as the wider practical purposes which are linked to
the occurrence of the particular judgements in question, and which may differ
greatly from case to case (cf. Dretske 2000; Papineau 1999). Another difficulty
for the normative approach is to show how the requirement (C) can actually be
derived from the truth norm (TN)—and if this fails, how it might be established
on other grounds. And a third challenge is to demonstrate that intentionally
grounding judgements in epistemic reasons is indeed a—and, moreover, the
only—truth-conducive means available to us. In fact, it has been be doubted
that deliberate reliance on epistemic reasons can function as an instrumental
means to truth—at least, if the latter is to be understood as one of our purposes
among many others (cf. Owens 2003).
3 . THE EXPERIENTIAL APPROACH
That the normative approach arguably fails in its attempt to establish a constraint
on our deliberate formation of judgements, which prevents it from being
straightforward in all possible cases, provides a good reason to look for an
alternative account. But the search for such an account is also, and independently,
motivated by the reasonable expectation and hope that theories which deny (TN)
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on other grounds should be able to account for the involuntariness of judgements
as well as their norm-orientated competitors. My aim is therefore to pave the way
for an argument showing why we cannot form judgements at will, which refers
to the phenomenal character of judgements instead of their normativity.
This argument can be summarized as follows. Its starting point is the idea that
we consciously experience our judgements always as epistemically motivated,
while we consciously experience the straightforward results of our deliberate
mental agency always as practically motivated. But, the reasoning continues,
experiencing a mental episode as practically motivated rules out experiencing it
as epistemically motivated—at least, if the episode concerned has been formed
in a deliberate and straightforward manner. For experiencing such an episode as
practically motivated means in fact experiencing it as immediately responding
to the practical motives in question. And the phenomenal aspect reflecting this
immediacy is incompatible with another potential aspect of experience, namely
that aspect which reflects epistemic motivation. Hence, our judgements cannot
result in a straightforward manner from our deliberate mental agency—which
means that we cannot form them at will.
It will become much clearer in due course, I hope, how precisely each
of the premisses involved in this argument should be understood, and also
how they may be defended. But the core idea of this argument is that we
experience certain conscious mental phenomena—such as judgements or mental
actions—as rationally motivated. This means, first of all, that these phenomena
possess a phenomenal or experiential character: they present themselves in
phenomenal consciousness, or are experienced by us, in a specific way; or, as
I will also say, they are phenomenally marked or revealed as being a certain
way.¹⁵ The core idea implies furthermore that the phenomenal characters of
the phenomena in question are of a particular kind: they involve a rational
dimension or aspect which reflects their rational nature. More specifically, the
conscious mental phenomena concerned are phenomenally marked as standing
in a certain kind of rational relation: we experience them as motivated by—that
is, as rationally based on and occurring (or having occurred) in response
to—reasons.¹⁶
¹⁵ Myuse of the term ‘experience’ is perhaps unusual in that it refers to phenomenal consciousness
rather than sensory experience. But it is akin to the German Erlebnis or erleben (especially as used
by phenomenologists, such as Husserl) and will much simplify the presentation of the experiential
approach. Other attempts at the notoriously difficult task of describing phenomenal consciousness
have characterized it in terms of how it is or feels like to undergo, or be in, the respective
events or states. Besides, I will leave it open whether the phenomenal character of episodes can
remain unnoticed, or whether phenomenal consciousness always involves or requires some form of
attention. This is unproblematic because forming a judgement deliberately, or ‘in full consciousness’
(cf. Williams 1973), will include attending to the judgement and the agency involved (cf. Peacocke
(1998) and O’Brien (2003) for a discussion of this kind of attention).
¹⁶ As I understand motivation here, it is equivalent to actual responsiveness to reasons, in the
sense that a mental episode or event is rationally motivated if it is initiated, guided, or otherwise
rationally determined by certain reasons. By contrast, in many meta-ethical discussions, the notion
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In what follows, I will simply assume that judgements, mental actions, and
the mental episodes which are the straightforward results of the latter are
phenomenally conscious, or part of the stream of consciousness, and thus possess
an experiential character. I will have to leave the defence of this assumption for
another occasion.¹⁷ Here, I will merely try to soften related doubts by making
clear that assuming the experiential form of awareness at issue is less demanding
than might be thought.
First, enjoying this kind of awareness need not require any specific con-
ceptual capacities, even if describing it in terms of experiencing an episode
as being a certain way might be taken to suggest just this. Saying that we
experience certain mental episodes as responding to reasons does not mean more
than saying that their phenomenal character shows a specific aspect, that the
phenomenal character of other episodes lacks this aspect, and that this phe-
nomenal difference somehow reflects the corresponding difference in origin and
determination. In a similar way, we experience red-perceptions as representing
a different colour than green-perceptions, or certain feelings as more pleasant
than others. And although it should usually be possible for us to conceptualize
such phenomenal differences in introspective higher-order judgements, such
a conceptualization does not necessarily already happen on the phenomenal
level.
Second, the form of awareness in question is minimal in the sense that we
can experience a mental episode or event as rationally motivated without being
aware of, or otherwise able to identify, the respective reasons. For instance,
when asked what the capital of Ecuador is, we may form and rely on the
judgement that it is Quito—say, as a manifestation of some previously acquired
belief—without being able to remember when or how we learnt this fact (e.g.
whether from listening to a teacher, from reading a book, or from looking at
a map; cf. Wedgwood 2002: 20). And it commonly happens to us that we
perform an action, such as entering a certain room, and recognize it as been
done deliberately by us, although we have forgotten why we did it. Moreover,
of ‘motivation’ is used in a more narrow and perhaps more technical sense, being limited to what
I call ‘practical motivation’. Furthermore, I am not concerned with ‘motivation’ in the sense of
having a certain desire or intention which has not (yet) become motivationally effective. And I
also take it that there are important and phenomenally salient differences between epistemic and
practical motivation—if only due to important differences between the respective kinds of reasons
or rationality. One such difference is, for instance, that while practical ends may often be achieved
in many different ways, reaching epistemic ends (i.e. truth or epistemic appropriateness) seems to
always require the reliance on evidence. And while our various practical ends interact with each
other (e.g. by outweighing or supporting each other), the epistemic ends appear to be completely
independent and isolated from them (cf. Owens 2003).
¹⁷ The assumption has been doubted, in particular, with respect to judgements. But most of the
related debate has concentrated on whether judgements possess a distinctive phenomenal character,
or whether differences in conceptual contents are phenomenally salient (cf. the discussions in Siewert
1998; Carruthers 2000), neither of which I assume here (cf. below)—though I defend, together
with Gianfranco Soldati, both claims in Dorsch and Soldati (2004).
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even when we are aware of the motivationally effective reasons and their specific
nature, this awareness need not be experiential.
Third, experiential awareness may be fallible in at least two respects. In both
cases, the phenomenal character of the episode or event concerned fails to
adequately reflect its nature. But the reasons for this are different. On the one
hand, this failure may be due to the fact that the episode or event in question
does not live up to how instances of the mental type, to which it belongs,
phenomenally purport to be. We may, for example, experience a judgement as
a judgement and, hence, as responding to epistemic reasons, although it has
been purely causally induced (e.g. by a drug, or by an emotion). On the other
hand, the failure may stem from the fact that we erroneously experience an
episode or event, not as an instance of the mental type to which it belongs, but
as an instance of another type. We may, for example, experience a judgement
as being a supposition—that is, we may experientially mistake a judgement
for a supposition—and thus fail to experience the judgement as epistemically
motivated.¹⁸
Correctly speaking, my main claim should therefore rather be that, if we
experience a judgement as a judgement, or an instance or product of straight-
forward and deliberate mental agency as such an instance or product, then we
always experience it as purporting to be rationally motivated. In other words, it
is essential to how we experience episodes as being judgements, or alternatively
as being part of straightforward and deliberate mental agency, that they present
themselves phenomenally as occurring in response to reasons. But out of sim-
plicity, I will continue to say that we always experience judgements, deliberate
mental actions, and their straightforward results as rationally motivated.
And fourth, the conscious phenomena in question need not possess distinctive
phenomenal characters, in terms of which they can be individuated and differen-
tiated from other phenomena. Judgements, for example, need not phenomenally
differ from other mental episodes which may also be experienced as epistemically
motivated (e.g. perhaps, episodic memories); and they need not phenomenally
differ among themselves, even if they differ, say, in content, origin, or motivation.
All that is claimed is that judgements are experienced as supported by epistemic
reasons. And similar considerations apply to our experience of deliberate mental
actions and the mental episodes which they produce.
¹⁸ Themany examples ofmainly pathological dissociations between our agency and our awareness
of it (e.g. those mentioned in Wegner (2004) and discussed in his book) will also fall into one or
the other category. The latter possibility of error would probably require, however, that episodes
could be recognized and identified as judgements by reference to features other than their being
actually experience by us in a certain way—for instance, in terms of their role in the acquisition of
relevant beliefs or the performance of certain actions. And this might very well mean again that it is
not essential to judgements that our actual experience of them shows some specific and distinctive
aspects (though it may still be essential to them that they are consciously experienced in some
way or another). More on the fallibility of experience and its relevance for the issue of involuntary
judgements can be found at the end of sect. 6.
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4. OUR EXPERIENCE OF JUDGEMENTS
What I want to try to defend first is the idea that the experiential character of
our judgements always possesses a certain epistemic dimension: we experience
our judgements as occurring in response to epistemic reasons. My defence
makes essential use of an argument for the further claim that we experience
judgements as epistemically reasonable, that is, as sufficiently supported by
epistemic reasons.¹⁹ This round-about strategy is possible because the two
aspects of the experiential character of judgements concerned correspond to
two intimately connected aspects of the epistemic status of judgements. Being
reasonable is, for a judgement, partly a matter of being motivated by reasons,
given that only (or at least primarily) motivating reasons contribute to the
rational standing of a judgement. If I judge that something is coloured on the
basis of my unjustified belief that it is green, my judgement will not be justified
either, even if there is a motivationally ineffective, but good reason for forming
this judgement available to me (e.g. the object may indeed be green, and I may
generally be in the position to recall one of my correct past perceptions of it
or simply to look at it again). Hence, if judgements turn out to be marked in
phenomenal consciousness as reasonable, it is to be expected that they will also
be phenomenally marked as rationally motivated. If it therefore can be made
plausible that we are, in some way or another, aware of judgements as reasonable,
this should provide substantial support for the claim that we are, in the same
way, aware of them as being motivated by reasons. In particular, experiencing a
judgement as rationally motivated would seem to be part of experiencing it as
reasonable.
My argument begins with the observation that we take our judgements to
be epistemically reasonable, at least as long as we are not aware of defeaters or
do not otherwise begin to doubt the epistemic standing of the judgements in
question. If we would not take our judgements to enjoy such reasonableness, we
probably would not rely on them as a provider of reasons for belief or action,
in the sense that we would not let them rationally contribute to our acquisition
of the corresponding non-occurrent beliefs or, by means of further theoretical
or practical deliberation, to our acquisition or revision of other judgements,
beliefs, or intentions. Instead, we would be inclined to revise them or give
them up, or indeed would have refrained from forming them in the first place.
That we—at least initially—take our judgements to be reasonable becomes also
apparent in cases in which we come to doubt the epistemic reasonableness of
one of our already existing judgements—say, because we begin to question the
¹⁹ In fact, these two phenomenal aspects seem to be part of an even richer epistemic dimension
of the experiential character of judgements, consisting in our phenomenal awareness of them as
providing reasons for belief or action.
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quality of the supporting evidence, recognize some fault in the cognitive processes
originally involved, or simply encounter an opposing view. The occurrence of
such a doubt presupposes that we are already aware of an initial claim to
reasonableness, which then becomes the subject of the doubt. In particular,
doubting a judgement on the grounds, say, that the perceptual conditions are
inadequate requires being aware of the fact that the judgement in question
has enjoyed rational support by a perception had under those inappropriate
conditions.
The observation that we take our judgements to be reasonable and, as part
of this, to be rationally motivated fits well with two other observations, namely
that we take our judgements to have occurred passively, and that we take
them to amount to knowledge (or at least to purport to do so) and treat
them accordingly—for instance, when we rely on them in the acquisition of
beliefs or the formation of intentions—even if they do not constitute knowledge
(cf. Williamson 2000; Wedgwood 2002; Hornsby 2005). It seems that we are
aware of our judgements as passive precisely because of—and perhaps even
by—being aware of them as based on epistemic reasons, that is, as determined
by passive epistemic processes. And assuming that knowledge requires both
truth and epistemic appropriateness, taking our judgements to be instances of
knowledge appears to involve taking them to be both true and reasonable.
Indeed, if it is furthermore accepted that the fact that judgements endorse a
proposition as true, and thus make a claim about how things are, is phenomenally
salient and distinguishes them experientially from, say, suppositions (cf. Dorsch
2005), it seems very plausible that the other aspect of the epistemic status of
judgements—that is, their reasonableness—should also be perspicuous in this
way. The idea is that, by presenting themselves in phenomenal consciousness
as instances of knowledge (independently of whether they in fact amount to
knowledge), judgements make two salient and interrelated claims to rationality:
that they represent adequately how things are; and that they are thereby
sufficiently rationally supported.
But a sceptic concerning the experiential awareness of the prima facie reas-
onableness of judgements is probably also a sceptic concerning the experiential
awareness of their claim to truth and knowledge. Therefore, I would like to put
forward another line of reasoning, according to which our primary awareness of
the reasonableness of our judgements should be best understood as a form of
experiential awareness, given that all plausible alternatives appear to be unten-
able. There seem to be two plausible competitors to this view: the inference
model and the prompting model.²⁰ Both these models have in common that
they take the awareness at issue to be the higher-order judgement that the
²⁰ Other candidates seem to be even less attractive (cf. O’Brien 2003), in particular the idea
that the awareness in question is a matter of some internal form of perception or observation
(cf. Shoemaker 1994; Burge 1996; Martin 1997).
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respective lower-order judgement is epistemically reasonable. But they differ in
their account of how we come to form that judgement.
The inference model maintains that the higher-order judgement under dis-
cussion is the result of a complex cognitive process. More specifically, it states
that we infer the prima facie reasonableness of our judgements. For instance,
we may believe that our judgements are generally reasonable as long as there are
no relevant defeaters or doubts, and we may introspectively recognize that the
mental episode in question is a judgement and that we have not been aware of any
relevant defeaters previous to our doubts. Or, alternatively, we may remember
how we have formed a judgement on the basis of certain pieces of evidence,
and we may recognize that we have taken this formation to be epistemically
appropriate, or at least have remained unaware of any inappropriateness, at the
time of its occurrence. In both cases, we can then conclude that the judgement
concerned has some claim to reasonableness.
However, that our primary awareness of the reasonableness of judgements is
often not the result of such inferences is illustrated by cases in which we are
ignorant about the general reasonableness of judgements, or about the particular
epistemic origin of the judgement at issue. The view that our judgements are
generally reasonable, as long as there are no defeating factors or circumstances
present, seems to be sufficiently complex and non-obvious for many subjects
(such as children) to lack it—in particular, since it requires a substantial amount
of theorizing (assuming that it is not based on how we consciously experience
judgements) and the possession of certain more technical concepts (such that
of a defeater). But this does not seem to prevent those subjects from taking
their individual judgements to be reasonable and to rely on them as providers
of reasons for belief or action. Similarly, as already illustrated above, we may
not remember what has ultimately provided support for our judgements and the
beliefs which they may manifest. But we may still take them to be reasonable
and trust them in our reasoning. And finally, our awareness of the reasonableness
of our judgements often occurs too immediately to involve, or be preceded by,
inferences of the kind described—for instance, when we enjoy such an awareness
as part of coming to doubt the epistemic standing of a given judgement in direct
reaction to, say, hearing a contradicting opinion or realizing that circumstances
have been rather non-standard.
The prompting model, in contrast, claims that the higher-order judgement
at issue (or a corresponding intuitive seeming²¹) occurs spontaneously, once we
begin to wonder whether the lower-order judgement is reasonable. According
²¹ The prompting model invites characterization in terms of intuitions. Depending on one’s
understanding of them, either the higher-order judgement itself, or some spontaneously occurring
rational seeming, on which the higher-order judgement is directly based, may be said to be intuitive
(cf. the essays in Bodrozic 2004)). In the latter case, my arguments against the prompting model will
concern the spontaneously occurring seemings, rather than the higher-order judgements grounded
in them.
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to this view, the higher-order judgement is neither based on some inference
or observation, nor simply the manifestation of a prior belief. Moreover, it is
not based on the conscious experience of the reasonableness of the lower-order
judgement. Otherwise, the experience would enjoy primacy over the higher-
order judgement, and we would have the experience, rather than the prompting,
model. Instead, the higher-order judgement is automatically prompted by our
wondering about the epistemic status of the lower-order judgement in virtue of
some reliable internal mechanism.
This internal mechanism cannot plausibly be due to some constitutive link
between the lower- and the higher-order state. It does not seem to be true,
for instance, that—assuming that we are rational and possess the required
concepts—the presence of the lower-order judgement entails (and is perhaps
entailed by) the possession of the higher-order belief that it is epistemically
reasonable, or at least the willingness to form the corresponding higher-order
judgement when considering the issue. The two mental phenomena in question
seem to be of such kinds as to be much more distinct than that. We can be
rational, have a well-functioning mind, and possess the concept of reasonableness
(or even prima facie reasonableness), but, when asking which epistemic standing
one of our judgements enjoys, still fail to apply the concept to the judgement.
In particular, no aspect of this concept, or of our possession of it, tells us that it
correctly applies to at least certain judgements. Recognizing that they enjoy such
reasonableness amounts to a more substantial piece of knowledge.²²
Hence, the lower-order judgement, together with our consideration of its
epistemic status, is perhaps better taken to reliably give rise to the higher-order
judgement via some contingent andmerely causal or informational relation.²³But
apart from the general difficulties linked to causal reliabilism or informationalist
semantics, this view faces the challenge to satisfactorily motivate the postulation
of the respective internal mechanism. This mechanism would seem very odd
and difficult to explain if such higher-order judgements spontaneously occurred
²² The assumption of a constitutive link is perhaps plausible with respect to higher-order
ascriptions of propositional contents or attitudes (cf. Shoemaker 1994; Burge 1996; Wright 1998).
But judgements about the reasonableness of other judgements are clearly of neither kind. And
see Peacocke (1998), Martin (1998), and O’Brien (2003) for more general objections to the
constitutive account and its central claim that higher- and lower-order states are not distinct entities.
One particular worry is, for instance, that the postulated constitutive link between the lower-
and higher-order states does not seem to provide the resources to explain how the latter can be
epistemically grounded on, and constitute genuine instances of knowledge of, the former.
²³ Peacocke’s account of self-knowledge seems to open up a third possibility: to take the link
to be rational, but non-constitutive. However, the considerations presented above against the
applicability of constitutivist accounts also rule out the applicability of Peacocke’s view, given that
the latter, too, implies that the occurrence of the conscious lower-order states, together with our
conceptual capacities and a rational and well-functioning mind, ensures that we are willing to
form the higher-order judgements in the relevant circumstances (cf. Peacocke 1996). Besides, it is
also interesting to note that Peacocke’s account goes beyond the prompting model, and has some
affinities to the experiential model, in that it assigns to consciousness an essential function in the
epistemology of self-knowledge (cf. n. 28 below).
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solely in response to wondering about the epistemic standing of lower-order
judgements, and not in response to wondering about some other feature or
some other mental episode. But to widen the scope of the prompting model
to other kinds of higher-order judgements seems to be plausible only in the
context of endorsing an account of introspection, or self-knowledge, in terms
of contingently but reliably prompted higher-order judgements. And such an
account seems to be highly implausible, especially if applied to the kind of
awareness under discussion.²⁴ One specific problem is that the reasonableness
of judgements seems to be among their features to which we can have direct
introspective access only if they are indeed marked in phenomenal consciousness.
The epistemic standing of judgements is at least in most cases a matter of their
rational relations to reason-providing states or facts extrinsic to them. Therefore,
if it is not reflected by an introspectible aspect of the experiential character of
judgements, it can be recognized only by means of a cognitive process which
encompasses more than the mere introspection of the judgement and its intrinsic
features—a cognitive process which, for instance, combines introspection with
inference and perhaps memory, as described above during the discussion of the
inferential model.²⁵
However, if our primary awareness of the reasonableness of judgements is
in at least many cases neither based on inferences, nor a matter of causally
prompted higher-order judgements, then it should be taken to be experiential.
No other plausible alternative suggests itself. Hence, taking our judgements to
be epistemically appropriate should be best understood as experiencing them as
enjoying the support of epistemic reasons—which again involves experiencing the
judgements as being motivated by such reasons. Our higher-order judgements
about the reasonableness of our lower-judgements may then be the result of
introspecting this epistemic aspect of the phenomenal character of the latter.
As I have already mentioned, that judgements are always marked in phe-
nomenal consciousness as occurring in response to reasons is compatible with
the possibility that they are actually not so motivated, and that correspondingly
our experiential awareness has failed us. We presumably react to such cases of
error by taking ourselves to have forgotten about the specific rational origins
²⁴ Among the more general objections to this account of introspection—which is endorsed,
for instance, by Armstrong (1993) and Lycan (1996)—are: that it has to assume some form of
causal reliabilism (cf. O’Brien 2003); that it cannot capture the transparency of mental content
(cf. Dretske 1999); and that it does not link the lower- and higher-order states intimately enough
to be able to account for the immediate rational impact of the latter on our revision of the former,
for our related epistemic responsibility, and for the impossibility of brute error (i.e. error not due
to the irrationality or malfunctioning of the subject) in the acquisition of self-knowledge (cf. Burge
1996; also Shoemaker 1994 and Siewert 1998).
²⁵ The same problem need not arise with respect to the introspection of externally determined
contents, given that the contents of the higher-order states may embed the contents of the lower-
order states and thus can inform us about them without having to tell us something about their
extrinsic relations (cf. Burge 1996; Peacocke 1996, 1998).
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of the judgements in question, or by coming to identify or construct new ones
(e.g. by interpreting the mental causes of the judgements—say, certain desires
or emotions—as their grounds). But our phenomenal awareness of judgements
as rationally motivated is also compatible with the possibility of self-justifying
judgements (if they are indeed a possibility). Such judgements provide epistemic
support for themselves in virtue of some feature which they possess (e.g. their
necessity, infallibility, certainty, etc.). And when we experience them as rationally
motivated, we are aware of this rational relation in which they stand to themselves
(e.g. by experiencing them as certain or self-evident). Nothing in what has been
said so far suggests or even requires that we experience judgements as motivated
by epistemic reasons distinct from themselves.
Much more problematic would be if some class of our judgements would
allow for epistemic appropriateness despite not permitting any support by
epistemic reasons, whether provided by the judgements themselves or by other
states or facts. However, none of our judgements seem to be of such a kind.²⁶
From an epistemic point of view, such states would be much more similar
to perceptions than to normal judgements. Maybe intuitions, or intellectual
seemings, may be of this type. Just like perceptions, they can perhaps be reliable
or otherwise epistemically appropriate, without standing in rational relations
supporting them. And just like perceptions, they are perhaps also immune to
any rational influence of reasons. But judgements seem to be very different.
Their epistemic appropriateness appears to be partly a matter of how well they
cohere with our already existing beliefs (as well as other judgements). And
this seems to mean, among other things, that the latter may provide us with
(access to) reasons for, or against, the formation or revision of judgements.
Moreover, our judgements appear to be sensitive to such reasons and react
accordingly—say, by disappearing when they are in too great a tension with
what else we believe.
5 . OUR EXPERIENCE OF MENTAL AGENCY
What is left to be shown is how their feature of being experienced as epistemically
motivated prevents judgements from being formed at will. In the remaining
sections, I will argue for this incompatibility in three steps. First, I will try to
make plausible that deliberate and straightforward mental agency (if successful)
results in mental episodes which are always experienced by us as actively
formed. Second, I will argue that this actually means that the respective episodes
present themselves as occurring in immediate response to practical reasons. And
²⁶ I take it that even perceptual judgements are not of this type, given that they are normally
rationally supported by perceptions. See e.g. Martin (1993) and Cruz and Pollock (1999) for
defences of this view.
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third, I will show that no mental episode can be experienced by us both as
being epistemically motivated and as being immediately practically motivated.
From this incompatibility between the two ways in which we may consciously
experience mental episodes, it follows that our conscious judgements cannot
result in a straightforward manner from our deliberate mental agency: for us,
there cannot be any judgements formed at will.
I take it that our instances of deliberate mental agency (and presumably of
deliberate agency in general) normally involve at least three elements (cf. e.g.
Pink 1996). First of all, there are certain practical reasons which are potential
motives for action, and which we are put in contact with by some of our mental
states—say, intentions, desires, or other states with the capacity to move us to
act. Then, there are the mental actions themselves which occur when we begin
to act on some of the provided reasons. Examples are the straightforward acts of
conjuring up an image or of making an explicit assumption. The mental actions
may thereby be partly or wholly successful in bringing about the respective mental
phenomena; or they may amount to something like mere attempts or tryings.
And finally, there is the motivational link between the two other elements. The
mental actions come into being once our practical reasons actually begin to
move us. And these reasons continue to guide us throughout our performance
of the resulting actions (cf. O’Brien 2003). According to this picture, practical
motivation is—just like epistemic motivation—a rational (and presumably
causal) relation; and it obtains precisely as long as the practical reasons stay
effective in initiating and guiding the mental actions concerned.
Often, however, our mental actions involve, or at least give rise to, a fourth
element: they bring about certain desired or intended mental phenomena as
their results. Trying to conjure up an image of a sunny forest may actually
produce such an image; while attempting to improve one’s mood by conjuring
up such an image may result in one’s becoming happier. Furthermore, some
of these results may be due to deliberate and straightforward mental agency.
The representational episodes produced by, or as part of, acts of successful
visualizing or supposing—such as the image of the sunny forest—are good
examples.
Now, we typically can tell whether one of our mental episodes has been the
result of our mental agency—at least, if it has been produced in a deliberate
and straightforward way. When you pictured to yourself the sunny forest, or
supposed that Goethe went to Stoos, you were presumably aware of the fact that
you actively formed the respective representational episodes. And your awareness
of them would presumably differ in this respect from the awareness you would
have when perceiving a sunny forest, or judging that Goethe visited Stoos, or
being confronted with the spontaneous and unbidden occurrence of an image
or thought with a corresponding content. The main issue with which I will be
concerned in the remainder of this section is how we can come to acquire this
kind of awareness. And the plausible options seem to be the same as in the case
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of our awareness of the epistemic reasonableness of judgements: the inference,
the prompting, and the experience model.²⁷
As above, the inference model maintains that we inferentially arrive at our
knowledge of the active origin of the respective mental episodes on the basis of
introspection, and perhaps also memory or other forms of knowledge. A person
successfully visualizing a sunny forest may, for instance, be introspectively aware
of her intention—or of her attempt to act on her intention—to picture such
a scene, as well as of the occurrence of the resulting image. Moreover, she may
notice that these phenomena are temporally ordered, and that there is a match
between the content of the intention or attempt at action and the nature of the
subsequent visual episode. And she may possess general knowledge of the fact
that such a combination of agreement and temporal order, which furthermore
involves an intention or attempt to do something, is usually not accidental, but
rather the consequence of the rational forces involved in practical motivation.
Hence, the person may be able to draw the conclusion that the image of the
forest has occurred, not spontaneously, but as the result of her own deliberate
mental agency initiated by her intention.
However, the demands put by the inference model on the knowing subject
are again too high. In order to come to know that some, but not others, of our
mental episodes have been actively formed, we do not seem to have to possess
knowledge of the non-accidental character and origin of the temporal order and
match of the mental phenomena involved in mental agency. Nor do we seem
to have to possess some of the concepts needed to entertain such knowledge or
draw the inferences required (e.g. the concept of the kind of match described).
In addition, our acquisition of the knowledge about the origin of our mental
episodes appears, from a subjective point of view, to be more immediate than
described by the inference model. It may be true that we infer the active or
passive origin of a given episode in very special circumstances (e.g. when we are
unsure about whether our primary way of acquiring this knowledge is working
properly). But it seems that we typically do not need to engage in such elaborate
reasoning in order to tell whether an episode is due to our own mental agency
(cf. Peacocke 1998; O’Brien 2003).
According to the prompting model, the higher-order judgements about the
active or passive origin of our mental episodes are not based on observation,
inference, or experience, but instead reliably prompted by simply paying attention
to the issue, or asking oneself the question, of how a certain presentmental episode
has been formed. Their occurrence is thus the product of some underlying causal
or informational mechanism, which is set in motion by consciously addressing
²⁷ An observational model can again be ruled out straight away (cf. O’Brien 2003). Although it
has been argued that our primary knowledge of our own bodily actions is mediated by proprioception
(cf. Dokic 2003), this idea obviously cannot be applied to mental agency. For the same reason,
outer perception could not play a role.
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the topic of the origin of a given mental episode. And they reliably track the
presence, or absence, of the special link obtaining between successful mental
actions and the mental episodes which they have produced in a straightforward
manner.
But this application of the prompting model is not very appealing, and
mainly for the same reason as above, namely its difficulty in motivating the
acceptance of the postulated internal mechanism. Again, it seems to make sense
to speak of reliably prompted higher-order judgements only if they are taken
to be introspective, or instances of self-knowledge. This idea is maybe more
plausible this time, given that the straightforward results of our successful mental
actions are perhaps constitutive parts of these actions (cf. Audi 1993), and
introspecting the results and their active nature may therefore happen as part of
introspecting the respective mental actions and their active nature. But it still
seems valid that theories of introspection in line with the prompting model are
much more plausible if they take the link between the lower- and the higher-
order states to be constitutive rather than causal or informational (cf. n. 24
above). However, the possibility of a constitutive account does not arise, since
we can satisfy all the relevant conditions concerning rationality, possession of
concepts, and so on, without being inclined to judge a given lower-order mental
episode to be actively or passively formed when asking ourselves the respective
question.²⁸
The experiential model seems, again, to be the best remaining alternative. It
claims that we become aware of the active or passive origin of our mental episodes
simply by having and experiencing them. In particular, we experience the mental
episodes resulting straightforwardly from our deliberate mental agency as actively
formed, while we presumably experience most or all other mental episodes as
having occurred in a passive manner. This is one reason why we experience a
²⁸ See O’Brien (2003) for more general criticism of the constitutivist approach to our self-
knowledge of our conscious actions. Her own account of such self-knowledge is formulated along
the lines of Peacocke’s account of our self-knowledge of conscious states. Accordingly, it assumes
a rational, but non-constitutive link between our actions and our self-knowledge of them, as well
as an essential role for the way in which we are conscious of our own actions, namely by means
of a ‘[conscious] sense of guiding our action, . . . a sense of control’ (ibid. 378). The latter aspect of
her theory seems to be very close to my idea that we experience our mental actions as motivated
and guided by practical reasons and renders her view more akin to the experiential than to the
prompting model.
Peacocke’s own view on our self-knowledge of (bodily) agency also assigns an essential epistemic
role to our non-observational conscious experience (or ‘awareness from the inside’) in the formation
of the higher-order judgement or belief that we are, or have been, successfully trying to do
something, at least in the case of basic or straightforward agency. Moreover, he takes the respective
experience to be an awareness of successfully trying (cf. Peacocke 2003: 103 and 105; and Ch. 10
below). Hence, the awareness may very well extend (as proposed by the experiential model) to that
mental episode the occurrence of which renders the respective attempt at mental action successful.
It is, however, unclear whether what he has in mind here is the way we phenomenally experience
actions—i.e. a phenomenal property of the episodes of acting themselves; or instead independent
and non-judgemental conscious states representing our mental actions (cf. Ch. 10).
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deliberately formed image of a sunny forest differently from a perception or a
spontaneous or remembered image of such a scene.
This picture fits very well with (but does not entail) the view that our primary
awareness of the active character of our deliberate mental actions is experiential,
too. And the truth of this further view would suggest (but, again, not imply) that
the straightforward results of our deliberate mental actions, given that they are
experienced in the same way as the mental actions itself, are constitutive parts
of the latter. The fact that we experience certain mental phenomena as active
may thus perhaps serve as a guide to agency: if we experience something as active,
then it normally is an instance of agency. However, the opposite does not seem
to be true: we do not appear to experience all instances or parts of action as
active. Most, if not all, examples of non-deliberate agency seem to lack the kind
of attentive conscious awareness of activity characteristic of deliberate agency
(cf. O’Shaughnessy 1980; Pink 1996). And when we intentionally improve our
mood by imagining something cheerful, we do not seem to experience the
resulting change in mood as actively produced, but only the images and thoughts
involved in bringing about that change. Given that the deliberate improvement
of one’s mood is none the less an instance of mediated agency, this suggests
that our experience of passivity does not always reveal all aspects of the origin
of the respective mental episodes. It discloses the direct passive origination in,
say, some epistemic or merely causal processes. But it does not also reveal the
prior deliberate mental activity which has started these processes. Therefore, this
ultimately suggests that our experience of activity is solely or primarily a guide to
deliberate and straightforward agency.
6 . THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE TWO KINDS
OF EXPERIENCE
This leads directly to the question of what it means to experience a mental
phenomenon as active. My answer to this question is that the respective
experience reveals at least two aspects of the mental agency concerned: that it is
practically motivated; and that it is so motivated in an immediate manner. This
may explain, among other things, why our experience of activity may very well
be a guide to straightforward agency, assuming that, normally, the phenomenal
character of our conscious mental states and events adequately reflects their
nature.
It appears very natural to say that our mental phenomena, which are marked
in phenomenal consciousness as active, present themselves thereby as practically
motivated. Experiencing some action or episode as practically motivated means
experiencing it as rationally responding to certain practical reasons. And our
deliberate mental actions (including our not entirely unsuccessful attempts at
them) are indeed sensitive to reasons in this way: they are initiated and guided
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throughout their performance by practical reasons provided to us by our desires,
intentions, or similar states. In fact, if our experience of our deliberate mental
actions did not reflect this sensitivity to reasons, it would not make much
sense to call it an experience of activity at all: practical motivation seems to
be at the heart of agency. Not surprisingly, when theorists talk about how
actions present themselves to us in phenomenal consciousness, they often resort
to characterizations very similar to mine.²⁹ And of course, our experiential
awareness of practical motivation is—just like our experience of epistemic
motivation—possibly non-conceptual, minimal, fallible, and non-distinctive in
the senses specified above.
However, my claim has been not only that we experience the results of our
deliberate and straightforward mental agency as practically motivated; but also
that we experience the straightforwardness of their motivation, meaning that we
experience them as immediately responding to the respective practical reasons.
To understand and support this thesis, it is helpful to consider first what it could
mean to experience some mental episode as responding to practical reasons in a
mediated way.
As already mentioned, mediated mental agency is characterized by the fact
that it—often deliberately—relies on certain passive processes in order to bring
about certain mental phenomena. For instance, when we act on the intention
to finally force a conclusion on a certain matter in the light of the epistemic
reasons already available to us, we usually do so with the expectation that
the respective epistemic processes or mechanisms triggered by us are likely to
compel us to endorse the proposition which best reflects our epistemic reasons.
Now, our experience of successfully forming a judgement in this way shows
two aspects, which correspond to two elements involved in such a formation.
First, our initial attempt to come to a conclusion by setting in motion certain
epistemic processes presents itself in phenomenal consciousness as active: we
are aware of it as a rational response to our underlying desire or intention to
force the issue. But second, the subsequently occurring impact of the triggered
epistemic mechanisms presents itself to us as passive: we are aware of the
compelling force of the epistemic reasons on our formation of the judgement
and, more precisely, on our actually drawing one particular conclusion, rather
than another. Accordingly, our complex experience of intentionally forming a
judgement on the basis of evidence has a double character: it involves both an
experience of the support provided by practical reasons and an experience of
the influence of the epistemic mechanisms. And something similar will be true
for other examples of mediated mental agency, whether they rely on epistemic
²⁹ In addition to O’Brien (cf. n. 28 above), Audi speaks of a ‘phenomenal sense of acting in
response’ to some reason (1993: 154), Wegner of a ‘feeling of voluntariness or doing a thing ‘‘on
purpose’’ ’ or of an ‘experience of consciously willing an action’ (2004: 650), and Siegel of a ‘special
sense or experience of carrying out an intentional action’ (2005: 280).
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processes (as when we deliberately try to remember something) or on merely
causal ones (as when we deliberately try to influence our mood by imagining
something).
Because the effects of the passive processes deliberately triggered by us occur
often almost immediately after we have begun (and finished) to perform the
respective action, it might seem as if we experience a singlemental phenomenon as
both active and passive. But cases in which we fail to form a judgement despite all
our attempts—say, because our evidence does not favour one conclusion over
another and thus lets the epistemic mechanisms run idle—indicate that there
are in fact two distinct phenomena with two distinct experiential characters. The
mental action of setting in motion the epistemic processes (i.e. the attempt to
judge the issue) is experienced as active, while the subsequent output of those
processes (i.e. the judgement) is experienced as passive. Other cases, in which
there is much more delay between the trigger and the product of the passive
processes involved, or in which the triggering action is bodily, make this even
clearer (cf. the example of inducing a judgement by deliberately taking a
slow-acting drug).
Our experience of successfully forming a mental episode in a more straight-
forward way, on the other hand, does not show such a double character.
Deliberately conjuring up an image will involve the awareness of the impact of
practical motivation on the resulting image, but not the awareness of the impact
of some epistemic or causal processes. Of course, we may sometimes become
aware of some obstacles beyond our influence when attempting to perform a
certain straightforward mental action. And we may experience their impact on
us in a very similar way to how we experience the force of the epistemic or causal
processes in the examples of deliberate mediated agency. For instance, when try-
ing to visualize an object with twenty equal sides, we may realize that we cannot
do this, and our attempt and recognition of failure may be accompanied by a
strong feeling of the imposition of respective limits on our capacities involved.
But if we succeed in forming the image, no such awareness of an obstacle or
an external force will occur. Similarly, our choice of what to visualize may be
influenced by epistemic considerations, and we may be consciously aware of this
fact (e.g. when we decide to visualize a sunny forest partly because of concluding
that this will calm us down). But this awareness of an epistemic impact will be
part of our formation of the respective desire or intention to visualize. And it
will therefore precede our straightforward agency of visualizing, as well as our
experience of our engagement in this activity.³⁰
³⁰ The case of guessing is equally unproblematic, but slightly more complicated, given that
any potential impact of the evidence available to us need not precede our active choice of which
proposition to accept, but instead may restrict it during our active engagement with it (cf. the
experience of external objects as restricting our active bodilymovement). In the light of what has been
said above (cf. esp. n. 4 above), the agency constitutive of guessing counts as straightforward, despite
the potential involvement of epistemic factors. For what we guess (in contrast to what we judge)
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These considerations about the various ways in which we can deliberately
influence what happens in our minds illustrate that our experiential awareness
of mental agency seems indeed to be restricted to deliberate and straightforward
agency and its mental products. But they equally link up to the observation that
this kind of experience reflects especially the straightforwardness of the kind of
agency concerned. For we experience the (not necessarily temporal) immediacy
of determination with which the direct results of deliberate mental agency occur
in response to the respective practical reasons. The idea is that we experience
the mental episodes which we intentionally produce without exploiting certain
passive processes as directly determined by and flowing from our motives and our
attempts to act on them. And it is an essential part of this experience of immediacy
that we are not aware of any determining factors other than practical motivation.
In other words, we experience the immediacy of the practical motivation partly
by not being conscious of any other determining factors as intervening between
our desire or intention and the formed images, apart from our mental agency.
When we visualize a sunny forest, we experience the resulting visual image as
a direct response to our attempt to visualize a sunny forest and, given that this
attempt flows immediately from our respective desire or intention, also as a direct
response to the latter.
By contrast, the mental episodes produced in a mediated way by our deliberate
mental activity do not present themselves as immediately responding to our
practical motives, given that they are experienced as determined by epistemic or
causal processes. When we intentionally form a judgement on the basis of the
evidence available to us, we are aware of the compelling impact of the epistemic
considerations determining which particular proposition we end up endorsing.
And this aspect of our experience of the judgement is responsible for the fact
that it cannot count as an experience of immediate practical motivation, given
that this experience of immediacy requires the absence of any awareness of
determining elements other than practical motives. This is precisely the reason
why the phenomenal character of our judgements is incompatible with the
phenomenal character of mental episodes resulting from our deliberate mental
agency in a straightforward way. For independently of whether our judgements
are actually motivated by epistemic reasons, they always phenomenally present
themselves to us as such. And this experiential awareness of an epistemic rational
influence would undermine—for the reason just mentioned—any awareness of
an immediate motivational impact of practical reasons. But such an awareness
of immediacy is always part of how we experience straightforwardly formed
episodes. Hence, none of our mental episodes can be phenomenally marked
is ultimately a matter of our choice (cf. n. 4). Moreover, the related experience of straightforward
agency is compatible with the potential simultaneous awareness of epistemic influence and limitation,
given that the latter is never experienced as fully determining what is guessed (in contrast to what
is judged), but as leaving room for the experience of the immediate impact of the practical reasons
concerned.
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for us both as a judgement and as a product of deliberate and straightforward
mental agency. And this explains why we cannot form judgements at will: we
would have to consciously experience the resulting episodes in a way which is
not open to us.
The fact that our experience of the immediacy of the practical motivation
of a given mental episode is incompatible with our simultaneous experience of
the same episode as occurring in response to epistemic motivation is perhaps
more fundamentally due to the fact that the respective two phenomenal aspects
reflect incompatible features of our episodes. Since no episode can be both
epistemically and straightforwardly practically motivated, it seems that, if one
aspect of the experiential character of one of our episodes adequately reflects its
epistemic motivation, another aspect cannot simultaneously adequately reflect
the straightforward practical motivation of the episode. Similarly, that we cannot
properly experience a perception both as representing red and as representing
green is maybe primarily due, not to how such perceptions actually present
themselves to us in phenomenal consciousness, but to the underlying fact that a
red-perception cannot simultaneously (and with respect to the same part of an
object) be a green-perception. Consequently, the incompatibility at issue may be
located only derivatively in how we experience the respective mental episodes,
and ultimately in which role these experiences play in our mental lives, namely
to reveal the nature of the episodes concerned.³¹
Given that—as already noted before—our experiential awareness is fallible,
it might however still be possible that we can actively form a judgement in
direct and conscious response to some of our desires or intentions, as long
as we do not experience the resulting judgement as a judgement, that is, as
epistemically motivated.³² But such a case would not count as an instance
³¹ The preceding considerations apply equally well to the many mental phenomena, which
mix imaginative or otherwise straightforwardly active elements with more passive—and often
cognitive—elements. Deliberately trying to visualize a particular friend as sitting in the chair
opposite to me will involve seeing the chair, actively recalling his appearance and imaginatively
combining and manipulating the ‘sensory material’ thereby provided to conjure up the image of
him sitting in the chair. And while the perceptual element occurs in a purely passive way, both the
mnemonic and the imaginative element involve conscious agency, albeit the former in a mediated
and the latter in a straightforward manner. What we thereby experience as active is precisely what
we do straightforwardly: namely, whatever needs to be done to trigger the respective mnemonic
process, as well as our conjuring up the image by using the provided ‘sensory material’. And the
same seems true of other more complex forms of mental agency. Calculating a sum in one’s head,
for instance, consists in actively triggering a series of epistemic processes (e.g. those providing us
with the result of adding or multiplying two numbers). But although the impact of these processes
is experienced as passive, we actively trigger them in a mediated way by means of performing a
more basic straightforward action, coming with the respective experience of agency. And a last
example is cases of visualizing where some of the details of the resulting image are passively ‘filled
in’ by the mind (e.g. due to our knowledge or memory of generic appearances) and experienced as
such, although the other aspects of the image are experienced as immediately determined by our
imaginative agency.
³² Thanks to Lucy O’Brien for pointing out this possibility.
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of deliberately forming a judgement in a straightforward manner. We might
have performed the described action on the basis of a desire or intention to
form a supposition; and a mistake might then have led to the occurrence
of a judgement experienced as a supposition. But then, we would have tried
to form a supposition, and not a judgement. Alternatively, we might have
intentionally set out to form a judgement in such a way that it is not experienced
by us as a judgement. But then, we would have had to exploit some passive
processes bringing about this phenomenal illusion and, hence, would not have
formed the judgement in a straightforward manner. There is perhaps also the
possibility that we might come up with and might act on the intention to form
a judgement at will in such a way as to fail to experience it as the straightforward
product of mental agency (i.e. as immediately practically motivated). But our
action could not be successful, given that the satisfaction of the two intended
goals—the straightforward formation of the judgement and the creation of
the phenomenal illusion—dictates incompatible means. Since we cannot bring
about phenomenal illusions at will, the achievement of the second goal requires
the reliance on certain causal processes. But it is precisely such a form of mediated
agency which is ruled out by the successful straightforward formation of the
judgement.
It has also been argued that our phenomenal experience is systematically
misleading with respect to the nature of our minds: either because there are no
instances of judging, imagining, or deliberate mental agency, despite it seeming
to us that way; or because there are such instances, but they are not as they
seem to us to be (cf. the eliminativist approaches to phenomenal consciousness).
Here is not the place to assess the respective arguments, but let me briefly note
the consequences their soundness would have for the experiential approach to
the involuntariness of judgements. If none of the mental phenomena at issue
existed, the question of whether we can form judgements at will would not arise,
but instead only the question of why it none the less seems to us as if there is a
difference between judging and imagining in respect to (what merely appears to
us to be) deliberateness and straightforwardness. The normative approach could
not hope to answer this question about our phenomenology: if there were no
judgements, then there would also be no norms for judgements. The experiential
approach, on the other hand, would still have something to say about the
difference between judging and imagining and would also have good chances to
be compatible with the—presumably causal and subpersonal—account of why
things erroneously seem to us a certain way in the first place. On the other hand,
that our phenomenal experience might turn out to generally misrepresent certain
aspects of the nature of our mental phenomena would not pose any problem for
the experiential approach, as long as the latter remains true of how we actually do
experience judgements and mental actions. If the phenomenal illusion concerned
the seeming rational motivation of judgements or deliberate mental actions, this
would in fact mean, again, that there are no judgements or deliberate mental
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actions, given that it is essential to these mental phenomena that they are rational
and normally rationally motivated. And if the phenomenal illusion concerned
some other aspect of the nature of judgements or deliberate mental actions, this
error would be irrelevant for the question of whether judgements can be formed
at will. For instance, it might indeed be the case that our actions are caused
by certain sub-personal factors in our minds, although we experience them as
originating in our tryings or volitions, or in us as conscious agents (cf. Wegner
2004). But our awareness of deliberate and straightforward activity would still
be correlated to the respective instances of mental agency; and it would still be
incompatible with our awareness of judgements.
7 . CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
What I have been trying to show is that the experiential approach succeeds in
establishing two things: the psychological and non-normative constraint on all
our possible judgements that they are always experienced by us as epistemically
motivated; and the incompatibility of this constraint with their deliberate and
straightforward formation and, in particular, with experiencing them as formed
in such a way.Mymain conclusion is therefore indeed that, for us, judging cannot
be active and deliberate in the same straightforward way in which imagining
can be active and deliberate. But the preceding considerations have also further
substantiated the idea that our conscious experience of agency is a guide to—and
only to—deliberate and straightforward agency, at least if mental activity is
concerned. If something mental is experienced as active, it is normally part of
deliberate mental agency. Our awareness of mental passivity, on the other hand,
seems less revelatory, given that it is still compatible with more mediated forms
of deliberate agency, such as in the example of intentionally changing one’s
mood and, indeed, in cases of deliberately forming judgements on the basis of
evidence.
The experiential approach is compatible with the idea that it is possible to
conceive of judgements as being formed at will, and to desire or intend to form
a particular judgement in this way. All it claims is that we are bound to fail
if we consciously try to act on such a desire or intention. In this respect, it is
likely to contradict the version of the normative approach which assumes that
the truth norm (TN), and presumably also something like the constraint (C),
are part of our concept of judgements, and that we have to employ this concept
when aiming to form a judgement or classifying a mental episode as a judgement.
Given the presupposition of certain further conceptual links (e.g. between truth
and evidence), this assumption may be said—following an argument similar
to the one presented during the discussion of (C)—to entail that we cannot
conceive of judgements as formed at will. And this again seems to imply that we
cannot deliberately produce them in a straightforward manner: either because we
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cannot form the required desires or intentions in the first place; or because our
necessary failure to conceive of judgements as judgements after their deliberate
and straightforward formation would prevent us from acquiring the knowledge
that we can perform this kind of action, while such knowledge appears to be
necessary for deliberate agency.³³ But apart from the fact that the objections
against the normative approach mentioned above also apply to this more complex
version of it, the latter faces its own specific difficulties. Notably, it seems very
doubtful that it can establish all the conceptual truths required; or, indeed, the
claim that we (including children) have to possess and employ such a rich concept
of judgements in order, say, to decide to make up our minds about a certain
issue, or to desire forming a particular judgement (e.g. by some manipulative
means) because it would make us happier if we did.
But the experiential approach has other advantages over the normative
approach, in all its facets. Not only can it easily accommodate the deliberate
formation of manipulated or induced judgements, it also promises to be extend-
able to non-normative involuntary mental episodes. The normative approach has
nothing to say about why we cannot form, say, perceptions, sensations or feelings
at will, given that these phenomena are not subject to norms or requirements
similar to (TN) or (C). By contrast, all kinds of involuntary mental episodes are
phenomenally conscious and thus permit, at least in principle, the application
of an argument which concentrates on this feature of them. It may be argued,
for instance, that the causal determination of perceptions or sensations by those
aspects of the world or our bodies, which they inform us about, becomes salient
in their phenomenal character; and that this aspect of how we experience them
is, again, incompatible with experiencing the immediacy involved in deliberate
and straightforward mental agency. The experiential approach may therefore
allow for a much more unified account of the involuntariness to be found in our
conscious mental lives than the normative approach.
If the experiential approach indeed turns out to be the right one, then the
involuntariness of our judgements is a matter of our psychology, and not of
our concepts: it depends first of all on how we, as a matter of fact, experience
judgements and mental actions. This leaves room for the possibility that the
involuntariness of our judgements is merely contingent, and that there might
be other creatures who experience these mental phenomena in very different
ways and, hence, may still be able to form judgements at will. So far, the
experiential approach has said nothing about this possibility. But it might
perhaps be supplemented in such a way as to rule it out and thus to ensure the
necessity of our inability to form judgements at will. The idea would be that
the rational aspect of the actual phenomenal character of our judgements and
mental actions is essential not only to how we in fact experience these conscious
³³ This seems to come very close to the first argument against voluntary beliefs to be found in
Williams (1973).
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mental phenomena, but also to how any potential being having them would
experience them. And this might perhaps be traced back to the idea that the
underlying rational nature of the respective phenomena can be phenomenally
revealed to subjects experiencing them solely in the way in which it is actually
disclosed to us—say, because how we experience these phenomena is constitutive
of, or constituted by, or otherwise inseparably linked to, how they really are.
This would still allow for experiential differences among subjects both of the
same and of distinct species, as long as they do not concern the phenomenal
disclosure of their rational nature (or of the respective aspects thereof ). But the
latter would necessarily be salient to all subjects in the same way and, hence,
give rise to the same phenomenal incompatibilities. This would explain why
we experience judgements and mental actions the way we experience them: as
of necessity, to experience some mental phenomenon as a judgement or as a
mental action would just mean, partly, to experience it as occurring in response
to reasons. However, it would perhaps also imply that our experiential awareness
of the rational aspects of our conscious minds is not primitive, and that a
more fundamental account of it and of why we cannot form judgements at
will can be formulated—namely in terms of those of their features which are
constitutively linked to their phenomenal character and ultimately make up their
nature.³⁴
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